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Abstract
The strong sequential core for two-stage economies with a possibly incomplete set of assets
in period zero and trade in commodities in period one consists of those goods allocations that
are in the classical core and moreover, after realization of the state of nature, in the core of the
economy where executed asset contracts serve as initial endowments. The strong sequential core
coincides with the classical core when all possible state-contingent contracts may serve as an asset.
For finance economies it is shown that the strong sequential core is generically empty when there
is an incomplete set of assets. Outside the setting of finance economies, we show that the strong
sequential core can be empty even if there is a complete set of assets. If the set of constrained
feasible allocations resulting from trading in assets, is enlarged to include also allocations outside
the agents’ consumption sets, then a complete set of assets is sufficient for the equivalence of the
resulting semi-strong sequential core and the classical core.
© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The usual implicit assumption for a cooperative solution concept like the core is that
the agents can write binding contracts on outcomes provided by that concept. In a static
situation like a one-shot cooperative game or an exchange economy it is not essential
whether a core allocation is regarded as a candidate for a binding contract or whether it is
directly interpreted as one. Agreeing on such an allocation is equivalent to carrying it out
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since nothing happens in between. This is radically different in a dynamic situation, even
in the case of complete certainty. Agents or coalitions might change their minds after an
originally agreed upon contract has partially been carried out, because it might no longer
be in their best interest to stick to it. In the case of uncertainty, where information becomes
available over time, this is even more likely to occur.
We consider the case of a two-period exchange economy under uncertainty. In period
zero there is trade in assets, the payoffs of which depend on the future, unknown, state of
the world. In period one the uncertainty is resolved, asset contracts are executed and on this
basis trade in commodities takes place. In the ex ante or classical core as in Aumann (1961),
coalitions consider the allocations that they can achieve in each state of nature by pooling
their endowments, and compute their ex ante utilities over these allocations. A classical
core allocation consists of a bundle of goods for each agent in each state of nature such that
no coalition can improve ex ante. In this notion asset trading does not play a role since in
any state of nature any redistribution of the initial endowments is agreed upon ex ante and
is compatible with any trade in assets in period zero.
The classical core concept, however, fails to take into account that agents can reconsider
their positions in the subeconomy at period one after resolution of the uncertainty. Then
asset trading becomes important since it determines the initial positions in each state of
nature. Coalitions might be able to improve upon the initial classical core allocation ex
post. A classical core allocation might not be incentive compatible once the state of nature
in period one is known. Similar point of views have been taken in Gale (1978), Repullo
(1988), and Koutsougeras (1998), who discuss sequential core concepts, and Kranich et al.
(2001), who study multi-period models under certainty where at each period the agents face
a cooperative game or an exchange economy.
To capture the implications of selfenforcement, we impose on top of the conditions of
the classical core, the requirement that in each state of nature the resulting allocation is in
the core of the subeconomy in which executed asset contracts serve as initial endowments.
The set of allocations satisfying these requirements is called the strong sequential core.
The strong sequential core is a very selective solution concept. As is evident from the def-
inition, it is a refinement of the classical core. The strong sequential core is therefore useful
to study how robust classical core elements are with respect to new blocking opportunities
that arise due to changed circumstances. It also allows us to study how existing assets can
be used to limit the creation of new blocking opportunities. Moreover, the strong sequential
core is a subset of both the weak sequential core as studied in Predtetchinski et al. (2002)
and of the two-stage core as introduced in Koutsougeras (1998). Therefore, when the strong
sequential core is non-empty, it gives a sharp and a reliable prediction for the outcome of
the cooperation in the two-period economies.
The strong sequential core is weakly increasing in the number of available assets: the more
assets there are in the economy, the larger is the set of allocations that are robust to coalitional
deviations in period t = 1, the larger is the strong sequential core. When each possible
contingent contract may serve as an asset, so there is an asset for each commodity contingent
on each state of nature, the strong sequential core coincides with the classical core. Indeed,
it is possible to implement the classical core allocation directly by an appropriate trade in
assets at period zero. Retrading at period one cannot lead to improvements by definition of
the classical core.
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For the general case with an incomplete set of assets, the strong sequential core can
be either empty or non-empty. For the special case of finance economies, i.e., one good
is traded at each state of nature, it is possible to obtain the sharper result that the strong
sequential core is generically (with respect to the initial endowments) empty if the number
of assets is two or more less than the number of states.
An obvious question is whether equivalence with the classical core is still obtained if
there is only a complete set of assets in the sense of Arrow (1953). The surprising answer
is that not only equivalence may fail to hold, but even that the strong sequential core may
be empty. We show that this is partially due to the requirement, implicit in the definition of
the strong sequential core, that the endowments in the subeconomies resulting from asset
trading in period zero, must be in the consumption sets of the agents.
We also define the so-called semi-strong sequential core. In that definition it is no longer
required that the endowments at the beginning of period one belong to the consumption sets
of the agents. We show that when there is a complete set of assets, then equivalence of the
classical core and the semi-strong sequential core obtains.
Throughout the paper we assume symmetric information. Dynamic aspects of cooper-
ation also play a role in economies with private information, where usually a third stage
between the ex ante and ex post stages is distinguished, namely an interim stage in which
the agents learn their private information. See for instance Vohra (1999) for a study of
the core in this framework. In these models, however, subject to incentive compatibility
constraints, a complete contracting environment results; for the special case of symmet-
ric information one is lead to the classical core. The study of asymmetric information
issues in an incomplete contracting framework remains an interesting subject for further
research.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the model and some
preliminaries, and Section 3 defines the strong sequential core. Section 4 considers the
special case of finance economies and Section 5 treats the general multiple commodity
case. Section 6 defines the semi-strong sequential core and states our equivalence result.
Section 7 concludes. The more involved proofs are collected in the Appendix A.
2. The model and preliminaries
2.1. The model
We consider an economy with two time periods (t = 0, 1) and uncertainty concerning
period one. Uncertainty is modelled as a finite set {1, . . . , S} of states of nature with given
probabilities ρs > 0, s = 1, . . . , S of occurrence. Period t = 0 is identified with state s = 0.
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents. Agents trade in J assets in period 0 and,
conditional on the realization of the state of nature s, inL commodities in period 1. In state of
nature s = 1, . . . , S, agent i has a consumption setXis ⊂ RL, so the consumption set of agent
i is given byXi =∏Ss=1 Xis. We denoteX =∏i∈N Xi. An agent i is further characterized by
his vector of initial endowments in state of nature s,ωis ∈ Xis, and his elementary (Bernoulli)
utility function uis : Xis → R. Agents are expected utility maximizers, with vi : Xi → R
the expected utility function defined by vi(xi) =∑Ss=1 ρsuis(xis).
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The matrix of asset payoffs is given by the SL × J matrix A. The generic entry Ajs,l of
the matrix A specifies the quantity of commodity l paid by asset j in state of nature s.
These components together define our economy, denoted by E. We shall often parametrize
economies by the agents’ endowments ω. A typical element of this family is denoted
by Eω.
The institutional set-up of the economy is as follows:
1. In period 0, trade in assets takes place. Alternatively, one may think of these trades
taking the form of state-contingent contracts. There are no endowments and therefore
no consumption in period t = 0.
2. Nature randomly chooses the state of nature. The execution of asset contracts takes place
and results in an allocation x.
3. Trade in commodities takes place. Agents treat allocation x as their initial endowments.
Trade in commodities results in an allocation y of commodities, which is consumed.
Notice that the institutional setting is one of dynamic exchange without markets. In partic-
ular, no prices are formed. Our analysis is therefore complementary to the extensive literature
on constrained suboptimality of competitive equilibria when asset markets are incomplete,
which originates from the contribution of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
An important role in our analysis is played by the the set of constrained feasible alloca-
tions
A =
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
ωi, xi − ωi ∈ 〈A〉
}
where 〈A〉 denotes the linear space spanned by the columns of A, i.e. the span of A. This is
the set of allocations that can be achieved by trade in assets in period 0. The set of allocations
that are constrained feasible under the initial endowments ω will also be denoted by Aω.
2.2. Subeconomies
The dynamic structure of the economy allows for the identification of a number of sube-
conomies.
The ex ante economy, i.e. the one that precedes the resolution of uncertainty, may be
associated with state of nature 0. This is the economy with commodity space RSL, con-
sumption sets Xi, expected utility functions vi, and initial endowments ωi. It is denoted by
E0. Formally
E0 = E(N,RSL, 〈Xi, vi, ωi〉i∈N)
The classical core of the economy E0 is denoted by C(E0), hence
C(E0)=
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
ωi;  ∃T ⊆ N,  ∃y ∈
∏
i∈T
Xi, such that
∑
i∈T
yi =
∑
i∈T
ωi and vi(yi) > vi(xi) for all i ∈ T
}
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Any constrained feasible allocation x gives rise to exactly S ex post subeconomies, one in
each of the possible states of nature, following the resolution of uncertainty. The economy
associated with state of nature s has commodity space RL, consumption sets Xis, utility
functions uis, and initial endowments xis. It is denoted by Es,x. Formally
Es,x = E(N,RL, 〈Xis, uis, xis〉i∈N)
The classical core of the economy Es,x is denoted by C(Es,x).
2.3. Example
Throughout the paper we exploit the following example. Consider the family of economies,
parameterized by the agents’ endowments ω ∈ Ω = RnSL++, in which N = {1, 2} and both
agents have identical consumption sets and utility functions given by
Xis = RL++ (1)
uis(y
i
s) =
L∑
l=1
ln (yisl), y
i
s ∈ RL++ (2)
vi(yi) =
S∑
s=1
1
S
L∑
l=1
ln (yisl), y
i ∈ RSL++ (3)
Note the implicit assumption that all states are equally likely. Let the initial endowments
ω ∈ Ω and the constrained feasible allocation x ∈ Aω be given. Define the numbers
αis(x) =
(
L∏
l=1
xisl
xΣsl
)1/L
αi0(x) =
(
S∏
s=1
L∏
l=1
xisl
xΣsl
)1/SL
where xΣ = x1 + x2. Then
P(E0,ω) =
{
y ∈ RnSL++|∃ti > 0, such that yi = tiωΣ, t1 + t2 = 1
}
(4)
is the set of Pareto optimal allocations and
C(E0,ω)=
{
y ∈ RnSL++|∃ti > 0, such that yi = tiωΣ, t1 + t2 = 1, ti ≥ αi0(ω)
}
(5)
C(Es,x)=
{
ys ∈ RnL++|∃ti > 0, such that yis = tiωΣs , t1 + t2 = 1, ti ≥ αis(x)
}
(6)
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are the classical cores of the subeconomies at states s = 0, 1, . . . , S. These expressions
will be helpful in expressing the the strong (and the semi-strong) sequential core for the
economy Eω.
3. The strong sequential core
We start with an example that illuminates some essential points behind the concept of
the strong sequential core.
3.1. Example
Consider the economy of Section 2.3 with two commodities and two possible states of
nature. The two agents have identical consumption sets and utility functions defined in
(1)–(3). The initial endowments are(
ω1
ω2
)
=
(
1 −  1 −   
  1 −  1 − 
)
where the first two columns correspond to s = 1 and the last two to s = 2. Assume for a
moment that there are no assets available in the economy. Then agents begin the exchange
game in period t = 1 having their initial endowments ω. Moreover, the initial allocation is
the only allocation that is robust to the coalitional deviations ex post, in period one. Hence, it
is the only candidate to belong to the strong sequential core. However, the initial allocation
is extremely unattractive from the ex ante viewpoint: in fact, for  close to zero, it is one of
the worst outcomes that may be implemented in the economy! It is very unlikely that such
an allocation will be agreed upon in period t = 0: nearly every feasible allocation would be
a profitable deviation from (ω1, ω2). In this situation the requirements of the ex post and
the ex ante coalitional stability are incompatible, and the strong sequential core is empty.
An important idea behind the strong sequential core is that if the set of the available assets
enlarges, then more allocations become robust to coalitional deviations in period t = 1.
Suppose that there is an asset in the economy, whose payoffs are given by the vector
A = (1, 0,−1, 0). This asset pays one unit of commodity l = 1 in state of nature s = 1
and minus one unit of the same commodity in state of nature s = 2. It is easy to see that in
the presence of such an asset the strong sequential core is nonempty. Indeed, the following
exchange may be arranged in period zero: agent 1 gives 1 − 2 units of the asset to agent
2. This asset trade would result in an allocation(
x¯1
x¯2
)
=
(
 1 −  1 −  
1 −    1 − 
)
∈ A
In the trade that follows the execution of contracts the fully symmetric allocation that
assigns one half of each commodity to each agent in each state of nature is robust to
coalitional deviations in period t = 1. Moreover, such an allocation belongs to the classical
core in the ex ante subeconomy, and is therefore an element of the strong sequential core.
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3.2. Definition of the strong sequential core
Definition 1. An allocation y¯ ∈ X is an element of the strong sequential core of the
economy E, denoted by SSC(E), if
1. y¯ ∈ C(E0).
2. There exists x¯ ∈ A such that y¯s ∈ C(Es,x¯) for all s = 1, . . . , S.
Point 1 of the definition requires that there are no deviations from y¯ in period t = 0. Point
2 guarantees that there are no deviations in the subsequent period, given appropriate asset
trades arranged at the outset.
In the absence of assets, the only constrained feasible allocation is ω. Consequently,
only those allocations are robust to deviations at period t = 1, which belong to the period
one cores C(Es,ω). However, when there are assets in the economy, the grand coalition can
support different allocations by redistributing assets among its members in period zero. We
may think of the grand coalition as redistributing assets in period t = 0 of the economy in
order to prevent subcoalitions from deviating in the subsequent period. According to this
interpretation, agents agree on asset trades and final consumption in period 0: since final
consumption is in the ex ante core, they have no reason to deviate before the state of nature
realizes. Then condition 2 guarantees that agents do not deviate in period 1.
Note that the strong sequential core increases when the set of constrained feasible allo-
cations increases. If, in particular, A has rank SL, then every classical core allocation can be
sustained as an allocation in the strong sequential core. Indeed, any classical core allocation
can be implemented directly by an appropriate trade in assets. At the arrival of period 1,
contracts are executed, and no retrading of commodities is needed. Summarizing, we get
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the set of assets traded in an economy expands, the strong sequential core
weakly increases. If A has rank SL, then SSC(E) = C(E0).
An important case where the rank of A is SL is the one where for each commodity con-
tingent on each state, there is a contract specifying its delivery in period 1. This corresponds
to the complete market structure as analyzed in traditional general equilibrium theory. Nev-
ertheless, the requirement that the rank of A equals SL is very demanding. The next two
sections consider the more interesting case where some assets are missing.
4. Finance economies
We start out with the special case of finance economies. In a finance economy there is just
one commodity in each state of nature. We assume that Xis = R+. If the utility functions
are strongly monotone, then for any x ∈ A and s = 1, . . . , S
C(Es,x) = {xs}
This implies that the strong sequential core is given by
SSC(E) = A ∩ C(E0)
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We make the following standard assumptions on the utility functions.
Assumption U.
1. vi : RS+ → R is continuous on RS+ and twice continuously differentiable on RS++.
2. For any xi ∈ RS++, ∇vi(xi) ∈ RS++.
3. For any xi ∈ RS++,
{
yi ∈ RS+|vi(yi) ≥ vi(xi)
} ⊆ RS++.
4. Indifference curves have non-zero Gaussian curvature, [xi ∈ RS++, h ∈ RS, h =
0, hT∇vi(xi) = 0] implies [hT∇2vi(xi)h < 0].
The proof of the following result is given in the Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Let Eω be a family of finance economies parameterized by the agent’s initial
endowments ω ∈ Ω = RSn++. Suppose that n ≥ 2, all vi satisfy assumption U, and rank
(A) = J .
1. If J < S − 1, then there exists a set of full measure Ω∗ ⊂ Ω such that for all
ω ∈ Ω∗
SSC(Eω) = ∅.
2. If J = S − 1, then there exists a set of full measure Ω∗ ⊂ Ω such that for all ω ∈ Ω∗
SSC(Eω) is either empty or finite.
Theorem 2 implies that if trade in assets is limited in the sense that the rank of the asset
matrix is smaller than S − 1, then there is a set of initial endowments for which the strong
sequential core is generically empty. If the rank of the asset matrix is equal to S − 1, then
there is a set of initial endowments for which the strong sequential core is generically empty
or finite. The latter statement cannot be strengthened in either direction. More precisely,
when J = S − 1, then there may exist two complementary subsets Ω¯ and Ω
¯
of Ω, both
with non-empty interiors, such that for all economies in the set Ω¯ the strong sequential
core is non-empty, and for all those in the set Ω
¯
the strong sequential core is empty. This is
demonstrated by the following example.
Example 1. Consider the following family of finance economies Eω parameterized by the
agents’ endowments ω ∈ Ω = RnS++. We assume that S ≥ 3, N = {1, 2} and the agents
have identical consumption sets and utility functions defined by (1)–(3). The S × (S − 1)
matrix of asset payoffs is given by
A =


1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
0 0 · · · 0


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The set of Pareto-efficient allocations and the core of the economy E0,ω are defined in
(4) and (7). Then
SSC(Eω) = C(E0,ω) ∩A ⊆ P(E0,ω) ∩A = {(t1(ω)ωΣ, t2(ω)ωΣ)} (7)
where ti(ω) = ωiS/ωΣS , the fraction of the total endowment in state S owned by agent i.
The strong sequential core of the economy Eω is therefore either an empty set or a
single-element set defined by (9). It is a single-element set if the allocation defined by (9)
is individually rational, and it is empty otherwise
SSC(Eω) =
{
{t1(ω)ωΣ, t2(ω)ωΣ} if ti(ω) ≥ αi0(ω) for i = 1, 2
∅ otherwise.
Define Ω¯ ⊂ Ω to be the set of initial allocations ω ∈ Ω satisfying
ti(ω) ≥ αi0(ω), i = 1, 2 (8)
and let Ω
¯
be its complement in Ω.
It remains to show that both sets have non-empty interiors. Whenever S ≥ 3, an allocation(
ω¯1
ω¯2
)
=
(
S 1 1 . . . 1 1
1 S 1 . . . 1 1
)
satisfies condition (8) with strict inequalities for both agents 1 and 2. Hence, it lies in the
interior of Ω¯. In contrast, allocation(
ω
¯
1
ω
¯
2
)
=
(
S S S . . . S 1
1 1 1 . . . 1 S
)
is such that t1(ω
¯
) < α10(ω
¯
). Hence, it is an interior point of the set Ω
¯
.
5. The multiple commodities case
Let the number of commodities be arbitrary,L ≥ 1. The first observation is that Theorem 2
cannot be extended to economies with multiple goods. When L > 1, then, irrespective of
the number of assets, there exist robust examples of economies with a non-empty strong
sequential core. That is, there is a subset Ω¯ ⊆ Ω with non-empty interior, such that for all
economies in Ω¯ the strong sequential core is non-empty. Such an example is the following
one.
Example 2 (Robust existence of the strong sequential core). We consider the family of
economies Eω parameterized by the agents’ endowments ω ∈ Ω = RnSL++. We assume that
L ≥ 2, N = {1, 2} and that the agents have identical consumption sets and utility functions
defined by (1)–(3). Assume that there are no assets.
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The cores for the economies inE0,ω andEs,ω are given by (7) and (8). The strong sequential
core of the economy Eω without assets is
SSC(Eω) = {y ∈ RnSL++|∃ti > 0, such that
yi = tiωΣ, t1 + t2 = 1, ti ≥ αi0(ω) ti ≥ αis(ω), s = 1, . . . , S}
It is non-empty if and only if the following condition is satisfied. There are no s, s′ ∈
{0, 1, . . . , S}, s = s′, such that
α1s (ω)+ α2s′(ω) > 1 (9)
If this condition is not satisfied, then the requirement of individual rationality for agent
1 in state of nature s is not compatible with the one for agent 2 in the state s′. Let Ω¯ be the
set of initial allocations ω ∈ Ω satisfying condition (9). The allocation(
ω¯1s
ω¯2s
)
=
(
1  1 . . . 1
 1 1 . . . 1
)
, s ∈ {1, . . . , S}
for  < 1, is such that for all s, s′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , S}, s = s′, the strict inequalities
α1s (ω)+ α2s′(ω) < 1 (10)
hold true. Therefore, this allocation is an interior point of the set Ω¯.
We conclude that for all economies in the interior of the set Ω¯ the strong sequential core
is non-empty. Due to Theorem 1, we can augment the economy by any number of assets
while preserving the robust nonemptiness of the strong sequential core.
It has already been noted (Theorem 1) that the strong sequential core weakly increases
in the rank of matrix A and that it coincides with C(E0) when the rank of A reaches SL. In
the remainder of this section we explore the case of a strongly complete set of assets, by
which me mean the following.
Definition 2. For any vector p ∈ RSL, let p ·A be the S× J-dimensional matrix with rows
psAs, s = 1, . . . , S. There is a strongly complete set of assets if for every p ∈ RSL++
rank (p · A) = S
In particular, this ‘condition’ implies that the rank of matrixA is not less thanS. Under this
assumption of strong completeness, financial markets equilibria exist, coincide with equi-
libria in the complete markets model, and are therefore Pareto-efficient, see Arrow (1953).
There are at least two reasons why one might conjecture that under strong completeness
the strong sequential core is non-empty, and in fact equal to the classical core. The first
intuition is based on the case of finance economies, where strong completeness is equivalent
to the requirement that the rank of A be S. We have already shown that in the setting of
finance economies the strong sequential core is equal to classical core when this rank
condition holds. The second intuition comes indeed from the above mentioned equivalence
between the complete markets model and an economy as described in Arrow (1953) with a
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sequential structure, but a complete set of Arrow securities. Note also that Theorem 1 states
equivalence to the classical core when the rank of A equals LS.
It turns out, however, that such a conjecture is false. Not only is there no equivalence to
the classical core. The strong sequential core might even be empty when L ≥ 2 and the set
of assets is strongly complete. A reason for the emptiness of the strong sequential core is
found in the definition ofA, the set of constrained feasible allocations. The requirement that
a constrained feasible allocation x should lie in a consumption set may prevent the strong
sequential core from existence, even when there is a strongly complete set of assets. This is
illustrated in the following example, and elaborated in the next section, where we consider
the semi-strong sequential core.
Example 3 (Non-existence for a strongly complete set of assets). Consider the family of
economies parameterized by the agents’ endowments ω ∈ Ω = RnSL++, in which N = {1, 2}
and the consumption sets and utility functions are as in (1)–(3). We specify only the last
L+ 1 rows of the asset matrix A
AS−1,L = {0, . . . , 0, 1}
AS,l = {0, . . . , 0, 0}, for l = 1, . . . , L− 1
AS,L = {0, . . . , 0, 1}
The other entries of the matrix may be chosen arbitrarily. This implies that the rank of A
does not exceed SL − L. Note, however, that the case of a strongly complete set of assets
is not excluded. For instance, if S = 3 and L = 2 the matrix
A =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1


has the required structure and satisfies the criterion in Definition 2.
We claim that all economies in some open subset of Ω have an empty strong sequential
core.
The classical cores of the economies E0,ω and Es,x are given by (7) and (8). The strong
sequential core of the economy Eω is the set
SSC(Eω) = {y ∈ RnSL++|∃ti > 0, such that yi = tiωΣ, t1 + t2 = 1, ti ≥ αi0(ω)
∃x ∈ Aω, such that ti ≥ αis(x), s = 1, . . . , S}
Take any ω ∈ Ω that satisfies the following inequalities
ω1S,L − ω1S−1,L > 0
(
ω1S,L − ω1S−1,L
ω1S,L
)1/L
α1S(ω)+ α20(ω) > 1
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and any x ∈ Aω. There exists a scalar θ (agent 1’s net trade in asset J) such that
x1S−1,L = ω1S−1,L + θ
x1S,l = ω1S,l, l = 1, . . . , L− 1
x1S,L = ω1S,L + θ
From the positivity constraint xS−1,L > 0 it follows that θ > −ω1S−1,L and that xS,L >
ω1S,L − ω1S−1,L. Therefore
α1S(x) = α1S(ω)
(
x1S,L
ω1S,L
)1/L
≥ α1S(ω)
(
ω1S,L − ω1S−1,L
ω1S,L
)1/L
which implies
α1S(x)+ α20(ω) > 1
The last inequality says that the condition of individual rationality for agent 1 in state of
nature S is not compatible with the condition of individual rationality for agent 2 in state
of nature 0. Because x was chosen arbitrarily in Aω, this implies that the strong sequential
core is empty.
A transfer of commodities from agent 1 to agent 2 in state of nature S might solve the
problem. It could diminish the value of α1S(·) and thus weaken the condition of individual
rationality for agent 1 in state of nature S. However, the only asset that pays in state of
nature S is asset J and it also pays in state of nature S − 1. Its payoffs are denominated in
the units of commodity L. Given that the initial endowment ω1S−1,L is sufficiently small,
any attempt to redistribute a unit of asset J from agent 1 to agent 2 results in an allocation
x that prescribes to agent 1 a negative amount x1S−1,L of commodity L in state of nature
S − 1. However, such an allocation is prohibited by the definition of A.
Thus, even though there is a strongly complete set of assets, there is no way to redistribute
commodities that become available to agent 1 in state of nature S. Any allocation x that may
potentially arise as a result of such a redistribution will be outside the consumption set, and
therefore is ruled out by the definition of A. This discussion leads to a natural weakening
of the strong sequential core, discussed in the next section.
6. The semi-strong sequential core
We first modify the definition of the set of constrained feasible allocations.
Definition 3. Let
A′ =
{
x ∈ RnSL
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
ωi, xi − ωi ∈ 〈A〉
}
be the set of semi-constrained feasible allocations. An allocation y¯ ∈ X is an element of
the semi-strong sequential core, denoted by SSC′(E), if
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1. y¯ ∈ C(E0).
2. there exists an x¯ ∈ A′ such that y¯s ∈ C(Es,x¯), s = 1, . . . , S.
The set of semi-constrained feasible allocations contains all allocations x that may po-
tentially arise as a result of trade in assets, even though some of the commodity bundles
specified by these allocations may lie outside the consumption set. The semi-strong se-
quential core allows for the interpretation that agents may have debts at the beginning
of period 1, that is an allocation outside the consumption set. By the end of period 1
all debts must be paid back, so that the final allocation y¯ belongs to the consumption
set.
Definition 3 involves an extension of the classical core to those economies Es,x, whose
initial endowments x do not belong to the consumption sets. To illustrate some implications
of this, define the set of allocations feasible for a coalition M ⊆ N in state s, given the
initial allocation x ∈ A′, as
Fs,x(M) =
{
ys ∈
∏
i∈M
R
L
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M
yis =
∑
i∈M
xis
}
Then the classical core of the economy Es,x is the set of all allocations y¯s ∈ Fs,x(N)
such that no M ⊆ N and ys ∈ Fs,x(M) exist with uis(yis) > uis(y¯is) for all i ∈ M. If the
aggregate endowment
∑
i∈M xis is inconsistent with individual consumption bundles in the
respective consumption sets of the agents of a coalition M, then the feasibility set for M is
empty. Coalition M can improve upon no allocation in the state of nature s. A coalition can
deviate only if it is able to pay back the aggregate debt of all its members. In particular, the
conditions of individual rationality are valid only for those agents whose initial endowments
are non-negative. It should be stressed that the extension of the classical core to a wider class
of economies does not involve the extension of the utility functions beyond the consumption
sets.
The main result of this section is the following theorem, which states the equivalence of
the classical core and the strong sequential core when there is a strongly complete set of
assets. Its proof is in the Appendix A.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the economy E satisfies the following assumptions: the con-
sumption sets Xi are convex; the utility functions uis are continuous, concave, and strongly
monotone; {yi ∈ Xi|vi(yi) ≥ vi(ωi)} ⊆ int (Xi); and there is a strongly complete set of
assets. Then SSC′(E) = C(E0).
The following example shows that an economy with an incomplete set of assets may have
an empty semi-strong sequential core.
Example 4. Consider the family of economies parameterized by the agents’ endowments
ω ∈ Ω = RnSL++, in which N = {1, 2}. As before, the consumption sets and utility functions
are given by (1)–(3). We assume AS = 0, so the case with a strongly complete set of assets
is excluded. Other entries of the matrixAmay be chosen arbitrarily. Then for all economies
in some open subset of Ω the semi-strong sequential core is empty.
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Notice that
C(Es,x)=
{
ys ∈ RnL++|∃ti > 0, such that
yis = tiωΣs , t1 + t2 = 1, ti ≥ αis(xs), whenever xis ∈ RL++
}
and
SSC′(Eω)=
{
y ∈ RnSL++|∃ti > 0, ∃x ∈ A′ω, such that
yi = tiωΣ, t1 + t2 = 1, ti ≥ αi0(ω) ti ≥ αis(xs),
whenever xis ∈ RL++
}
Note that the conditions of individual rationality are only valid for those agents i whose
bundle xis is strictly positive.
The requirement AS = 0 implies that xS = ωS for any semi-constrained feasible alloca-
tion x. Therefore, for any ω satisfying
αiS(ωS)+ αj0(ω) > 1(i = j)
the semi-strong sequential core of the economy Eω is empty.
The last inequality implies that the condition of individual rationality for agent i in state
of nature S is not compatible with the condition of individual rationality for agent j in state
of nature 0. Redistribution of commodities from agent i to agent j in state S of the world
could diminish the value of αiS(·) and thus weaken the condition of individual rationality
for agent i in state S. However, redistribution of goods that become available in state S via
trade in assets is not possible. In this way incompleteness of the set of assets may result in
the emptiness of the semi-strong sequential core.
7. Concluding remarks
The fact that most economic interaction takes place over time has received very limited
attention in the part of the economic literature that focuses on cooperative solution concepts
like the core. In this paper, we study the implications arising from the unraveling of time and
uncertainty for the concept of the core. The strong sequential core imposes an additional
requirement of time consistency on the classical core, in the sense that a strong sequential
core allocation can be implemented without any coalition having an incentive to deviate at
any point in time.
The strong sequential core highlights a stabilizing property of assets. The strong se-
quential core is weakly increasing in the number of assets traded. The strong sequential
core is shown to be equivalent to the classical core when each possible contingent con-
tract can be traded before the resolution of uncertainty. Surprisingly, equivalence and even
non-emptiness of the strong sequential core may fail under quite stringent notions of com-
pleteness of the set of assets being traded.
The possible emptiness of the strong sequential core suggests to consider weakenings
of it. One is to allow for debts at the beginning of period one, leading to the semi-strong
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sequential core, which is also studied in this paper. The semi-strong sequential core leads
to equivalence to the classical core when the set of assets traded is strongly complete, but
might still be empty otherwise. Another weakening of the strong sequential core can be
obtained by requiring that possible blocking allocations of coalitions are credible in the
sense that they should belong to the strong sequential core of the economy restricted to
that coalition. This weak sequential core concept is studied in Predtetchinski et al. (2002).
Although the weak sequential core is a superset of the strong sequential core, it might still be
empty when the set of assets is not sufficiently complete. Blending time and uncertainty with
cooperative solution concepts therefore points at serious problems in the implementation
of such concepts, in particular when it is only possible to trade in a limited set of contracts
at the outset.
Acknowledgements
Helpful comments of Andres Perea and of the participants of the European Workshop on
General Equilibrium Theory, May 2001, Maastricht, are gratefully acknowledged.
Appendix A. Proofs
In this Appendix A we provide proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 2
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider a finance economy E, in which the consumption sets Xi are closed
and bounded from below, and the Bernoulli utility functions uis are continuous and strongly
monotone. Then the strong sequential core of the economy E is a compact set.
Proof. Recall that the strong sequential core of E is given by
SSC(E) = C(E0) ∩A
Under the assumption that the sets Xi are bounded from below, the set A of constrained
feasible allocations for the economy E is bounded. It remains to be verified that the strong
sequential core is a closed set.
Consider the sequence yq in SSC(E) converging to a point y0 ∈ RSn. Then, since the sets
Xi are closed, y0 ∈ A. Suppose that there is a coalitionM ⊆ N and an allocation y˜, feasible
for M, such that vi(y˜i) > vi(yi0) for all i ∈ M. Then, due to the continuity of vi, for q large
enough the inequalities vi(y˜i) > vi(yiq) for all i ∈ M hold true, implying that yq is not an
element of C(E0), contradicting the definition of yq. Consequently, y0 ∈ C(E0). 
We use the following additional definitions.
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• & = {(ω, θ) ∈ Ω× RJn|ωi + Aθi ∈ RS++,∑ni=1 θi = 0}, a smooth (Sn + Jn − J)-
dimensional manifold.
• S = {z ∈ RS++|‖z‖ = 1}, the intersection of the strictly positive orthant with the unit
sphere, a smooth (S − 1)-dimensional manifold.
• Sn, the product of n unit spheres S, a smooth n(S − 1)-dimensional manifold.
• ∆ = {(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Sn|zi = zj, i, j = 1, . . . , n}, a smooth (S − 1)-dimensional
submanifold of Sn.
• gi: RS++ → S, a normalized gradient of the function vi, defined as
gi(yi) = ∇v
i(yi)
‖∇vi(yi)‖ , ∀y
i ∈ RS++ (A.1)
• h: & → Sn, a function defined by
h(ω, θ) = (g1(ω1 + Aθ1), . . . , gn(ωn + Aθn)),∀(ω, θ) ∈ &
For a smooth manifoldM, and x¯ a point inM, Tx¯(M) denotes the tangent space toM at x¯.
We claim that the linear mapping
Dξh(ξ¯) : Tξ¯(&) → Th(ξ¯)(Sn)
is surjective for any ξ¯ ∈ &. To show this we only need the fact that the linear mappings
Dxig
i(x¯i) : RS → Tgi(x¯i)(S) are surjective, which follows immediately from the non-zero
Gaussian curvature of vi, see Debreu (1972).
Let ξ¯ = (ω¯, θ¯), x¯i = ω¯i + Aθ¯i, i = 1, . . . , n. Take any vectors dgi ∈ Tgi(x¯i)(S), so that
dg ∈ Th(ξ¯)(Sn). The surjectiveness of Dxigi(x¯i) implies that there are vectors dωi ∈ RS
such that
Dxig
i(x¯i)dωi = dgi
If we set dθi all equal to zero, then dξ = (dω, dθ) ∈ Tξ¯(&), and
Dξh(ξ¯)dξ = dg
Since dg was chosen arbitrarily in the tangent space of Sn, this shows the surjectivity of the
Dξh(ξ¯).
Surjectivity of the differentialDξh(ξ¯) for all ξ¯ ∈ & implies that the functionh is transverse
to any submanifold of Sn. In particular, h is transverse to ∆. The preimage of ∆ under h
h−1(∆)=
{
(ω, θ) ∈ Ω× RJn
∣∣∣∣∣ωi + Aθi ∈ RS++,
n∑
i=1
θi = 0,
gi(ωi + Aθi) = gk(ωk + Aθk)i, k = 1, . . . , n
}
is non-empty. Moreover, it is a smooth submanifold of &, and its dimension is given by
dim h−1(∆)= dim&− dim Sn + dim∆
= (Sn + Jn − J)− n(S − 1)+ (S − 1) = (n− 1)(J + 1)+ S
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Let pr : h−1(∆) → Ω be defined by pr(ω, θ) = ω for all (ω, θ) ∈ &. If J < S − 1, then
dim h−1(∆) < dimΩ. By Sard’s Theorem the projection of h−1(∆) into Ω has Lebesgue
measure zero. Therefore, there is a set of full measure Ω∗ ⊂ Ω such that pr−1(ω) = ∅ for
all ω ∈ Ω∗. If J = S − 1, then dim h−1(∆) = dimΩ. In this case, there is a set of full
measure Ω∗ ⊂ Ω such that for all ω ∈ Ω∗ the set pr−1(ω) is a zero-dimensional manifold.
Observe that any manifold of dimension zero is a discrete set.
Under the assumptions of the theorem, the strong sequential core of the finance economy
Eω is contained in the set{
x ∈ RSn++
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
ωi, xi − ωi ∈ 〈A〉, gi(xi) = gk(xk), i, k = 1, . . . , n
}
which is homeomorphic to pr−1(ω). Moreover, SSC(Eω) is a compact set. The observation
that any compact and discrete set is finite completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
Let P(E0) and P(Es,ω) be the sets of Pareto-efficient allocations for the economies E0
and Es,ω, respectively. Theorem 3 is proved in three steps
1. [y ∈ P(E0)] implies [ys ∈ P(Es,ω) for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S}].
2. [ys ∈ P(Es,ω) ∩ int(Xs) for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S}] implies [∃x ∈ A′ : ys ∈ C(Es,x) for all
s ∈ {1, . . . , S}].
3. SSC(E) = C(E0).
Step 1. Suppose that there is an allocation y which is Pareto-efficient in the economy E0
and not Pareto-efficient in the economy Eσ,ω in some state σ ∈ {1, . . . , S}. Then there exists
an allocation y˜σ ∈ Xσ , such that∑
i∈N
y˜iσ =
∑
i∈N
ωiσ; uiσ(y˜iσ) ≥ uiσ(yiσ)∀i ∈ N
with some strict inequality. Define the allocation yˆ as follows:
yˆis =
{
y˜iσ if s = σ,
yis otherwise.
Then allocation yˆ is feasible in the economy E0, and
vi(yˆi) ≥ vi(yi)∀i ∈ N
with some strict inequality, contradicting the fact that y is Pareto-efficient in the state zero
economy.
Step 2. Take an allocation y such that ys ∈ P(Es,ω)∩ int(Xs) for all s ∈ {1, . . . , S}. Under
the assumptions of the theorem, the Second Welfare theorem implies that there exist vectors
of commodity prices ps ∈ RL++ such that (ys, ps) is an equilibrium with transfers of the
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economy Es,ω. Let the distribution of wealth in this equilibrium be given by (w1s , . . . , wns ).
By the assumption of a complete set of assets, the system of equations

wi1
...
wiS

 =


p1ω
i
1
...
pSω
i
S

+


p1A1
...
pSAS

 θi
has a solution with respect to θi for all i ∈ N. Denote this solution by θ¯i and let xi = ωi+Aθ¯i.
It is obvious that x ∈ A′.
Since psxis = wis for all i ∈ N, (ys, ps) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy
Es,x (of the state s economy with initial allocation x). The observation that any equilibrium
allocation of the economy Es,x is an element of the classical core of this economy completes
Step 2.
Step 3. Take allocation y inC(E0), arbitrarily. Then the conditions of individual rationality,
vi(yi) ≥ vi(ωi), imply that yi ∈ int (Xi). Moreover, y is Pareto-optimal in the economy
E0. Steps 1 and 2 then imply that y is an element of the semi-strong sequential core. This
completes the proof since it follows readily from the definition of the strong sequential core
that SSC(E) ⊂ C(E0). 
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